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Abstract:  
In a closed economy general equilibrium model, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) 
find large welfare gains to removing firing restrictions. We explore the extent to which 
international trade alters this result. When economies trade, labor market policies in 
one country spill over to other countries through their effect on the terms of trade. A 
key finding in the open economy is that the share of the welfare gains from domestic 
labor market reform exported substantially exceeds the share of goods exported. In 
our baseline case, 105 percent of the welfare gains are exported even though the 
domestic economy only exports 30 percent of its goods. Thus, with international trade 
a country receives little to no benefit, and possibly even loses, from unilaterally 
reforming its labor market. A coordinated elimination of firing taxes yields 
considerable benefits. We find the welfare gains to the U.K. from labor market reform 
by its continental trading partners of 0.21 percent of steady state consumption. This 
insight provides some explanation for recent efforts toward labor market reform in the 
European Union. 
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1 Introduction
Continental European labor markets are characterized by a number of regulations which limit the willingness
of rms to create and destroy jobs. These policies appear to contribute to the generally higher levels of
unemployment in Europe relative to the U.S. Among these regulations, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
and Veracierto (2001) nd that ring restrictions also generate signicant welfare costs. Despite these costs
individual European economies maintain these policies. Some recent discussions of reform have occurred
within the multilateral framework of the European Union. In these discussion, the U.K., the country with
the fewest regulations of job turnover, is the strongest proponent of reforming ring restrictions.
This article has three goals. First, we seek to understand the reluctance of individual European countries
to eliminate unilaterally ring restrictions. Second, we would like to explain why labor market reform is being
initiated through multilateral channels. And third, we would like to understand why the U.K. is pushing for
labor market reform by its trading partners. For this purpose, we develop a two-country general equilibrium
model of establishment dynamics and international trade. The model is calibrated to European data and the
e¤ect of ring taxes are analyzed.
This article is closely related to the analysis of ring taxes by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and
Veracierto (2001).1 It extends their analysis by introducing international trade and permits us to analyze
the international transmission of domestic ring restrictions.2 Given that European economies are tightly
integrated through trade, this provides a more accurate measure of the welfare costs of removing ring
restrictions for European economies. It also allows us to consider the role of trade in maintaining these ring
tax policies.
1Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Millard and Mortensen (1997) nd that ring taxes reduce both job creation and job
destruction and thus have an ambiguous e¤ect on employment. Delacroix (2003) and Ljungqvist (2002) determine how the net
e¤ect on employment depends on the nature and timing of ring costs.
2Fogli (2000) and Saint-Paul (2002a) have attributed the emergence and persistence of these labor market policies to political
economy considerations. Saint-Paul (2000) suggests that under certain conditions a two-tier reform system may be successful
in implementing reform. We abstract from this channel to focus on the international transmission of these policies and the
interaction between countries. These interactions imply that a multilateral approach is necessary for successful reform.
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The economy considered is a two-country, two-good model of Ricardian trade. Each country specializes in
the production of a single good. Within each country, this good is produced by a large number of heterogenous
rms facing persistent idiosyncratic technology shocks. Firms respond to these shocks by entering and exiting,
expanding and contracting over time. Firing taxes distort employment decision as rms are less prone to hire
and re workers. Thus, ring taxes create both a productive ine¢ ciency and competitive ine¢ ciency. The
productive ine¢ ciency occurs as the ring costs imply that the marginal product of labor is not equal across
rms. The competitive ine¢ ciency occurs because all rms will eventually exit so that ring taxes are a
tax on the lifecycle of a rm. Combined, these two e¤ects lead to a reduction in aggregate employment and
output. Previous work quanties the magnitude of these e¤ects and determines the implication for welfare in
the closed economy. In this paper, we show that with international trade the reduction in output improves
the terms of trade of the country with the ring costs and provides a possible benet to domestic agents.3 It
implies that some of the welfare costs of this policy are borne by foreign agents.
Similar to Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2001), we nd that ring taxes equal to eleven
months of wages reduce steady state output by 4.13 percent, consumption by 3.22 percent, and employment
by 4.50 percent in the country with the ring taxes. In contrast to their work however, we nd smaller welfare
costs to these policies. There are two reasons we nd smaller welfare costs. First, in contrast to previous
work, we evaluate the impact of exempting small rms from ring restrictions. Since most rms are small this
reduces the distortions at the rm level. Second, and more central to this paper, we consider the impact of
international trade linkages. We nd these ring taxes have a sizable e¤ect on a countrys trading partners,
reducing foreign consumption by 0.92 percent through a 3.06 percent worsening of its terms of trade. Because
of this trade linkage, we nd that unilaterally eliminating ring taxes lowers welfare by 0.04 percent of steady
state consumption in the country undertaking reform and raises the trading partners welfare by 0.92 percent
3All of the benets in this model are due to the change in the terms of trade. Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) consider the
potential benets of ring restrictions when there are nancial and relocation frictions. To the extent that ring costs contribute
to lower employment and output, the mechanism outlined here will have the same e¤ect.
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of steady state consumption. This large spillover occurs even with moderate amounts of international trade
of 30 percent of GDP. Consequently, by welfare measures, countries have no incentive to eliminate these ring
costs. Moreover, countries without ring taxes, like the UK, have the most to gain from reform by their
trading partners.
A key nding in the open economy is that the share of the welfare gains from domestic labor market reform
exported substantially exceeds the share of goods exported. In our baseline case, 105 percent of the gains are
exported even though the domestic economy only exports 30 percent of its goods. That the share of welfare
gains is about 3 and half times the share of trade is perhaps surprising. Firing costs reduce the incentive to
work and thus articially reduce the supply of a countrys goods, improving its terms of trade. Eliminating
these ring taxes leads workers to supply more labor. The countrys welfare gain is the di¤erence between
the utility gain from increased consumption and the utility loss from reduced leisure. However, the increased
supply of the domestic good also worsens the countrys terms of trade, which lowers the domestic economys
real income and reduces the consumption gain.4 In our baseline case, the terms of trade e¤ect lowers the
consumption gain in proportion to the trade share without a¤ecting the utility loss from reduced leisure. Thus
the share of the welfare gains exported substantially exceed the share of goods exported. We nd that the
proportion of the welfare gains from domestic reform that are exported increases with the reformers total
trade share, while the benets to its trading partners increase with the two countrys bilateral trade shares.
For France, Germany and Italy, we nd that the gains to unilaterally reforming labor markets tend to be
negative or small so that there is little incentive to change from the status quo. On the other hand, the gains
to a coordinated elimination of ring taxes by European economies are relatively large, providing a welfare
gain of approximately 0.88 percent of lifetime consumption. Such a reform would raise welfare in the U.K.,
a large trading partner of these Continental economies, by 0.21 percent of lifetime consumption. In contrast,
4The results are similar to those in the optimal tari¤ literature summarized by Corden (1984). Much like a tari¤, the labor
market restrictions considered reduce the supply of a countrys goods thereby improving its terms of trade. Unlike tari¤s though,
these labor market distortions can distort productivity.
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Mendoza and Tesar (2005) nd the welfare gains to international coordination of more conventional capital
and labor taxes are approximately 0.26 percent of lifetime consumption.
Many researchers have investigated the economic e¤ects of domestic labor market distortions and inter-
national trade.5 Most work in this area focuses on minimum wage policies and the pattern of comparative
advantage and employment.6 Closely related to our work is Saint-Paul (2002b), who studies the e¤ect of ring
costs on the pattern of trade. In a model with a product life cycle, Saint-Paul nds that ring taxes shift
countries toward industries with stable demand mature goods late in the product life-cycle. Firing taxes
may improve welfare when specializing in the secondary innovation to produce mature goods yields e¢ ciency
gains. Calmfors (2001) and Sibert and Sutherland (2001) study the incentive to reform labor markets in a
monetary union. These papers focus on the use of monetary policy to reduce structural unemployment and
respond to asymmetric shocks through a temporary change in the terms of trade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some recent developments in Europe to reform
labor markets. Section 3 describes the baseline model. In section 4, we discuss the competitive equilibrium,
and in section 5 the model is calibrated to a composite of the three largest European economies for which
ring costs are considered to be high - France, Germany, and Italy. In section 6, the quantitative e¤ects of
a change in policy are analyzed. Section 7 explores the sensitivity of the results to the amount of trade, the
strength of the terms of trade e¤ect, and the structure of ring taxes. The results do not change qualitatively.
Section 8 concludes and considers possible extensions.
5Bhagwati (1971) provides a concise summary of the theory of international trade under domestic distortions.
6Brecher (1974) nds that minimum wage policies may reverse the pattern of comparative advantage. Davis (1998a,b) shows
that when there is international trade minimum wage policies generate considerably more unemployment than in a closed economy.
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2 The European context
Beginning with the 1997 Luxembourg Extraordinary European Council Meeting on Employment, and con-
tinuing in subsequent Council meetings, the member states of the European Union have met to discuss the
unemployment situation in Europe.7 The result is the European Employment Strategy (EES), which seeks to
improve employability, develop entrepreneurship, encourage adaptability in businesses and their employees,
and strengthen the policies for equal opportunities.8 The EES emphasizes the use of funded active labor
market policies such as training, employment subsidies and job search assistance, with little reference to em-
ployment protection legislation (EPL). The EES is carried out through an open method of coordination
between Member States. The European Council in Lisbon in 2000 built upon the foundations of the Luxem-
bourg Summit and set a new strategic goal for the next decade, dened as the Lisbon Strategy, to become
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, with policies aiming at modernizing the
European social model by investing in people and building an active welfare state.It also rened the coor-
dination method by agreeing that, every year, the European council should agree on employment guidelines
for each Member State.
The EES provided for an impact evaluation ve years after the Luxembourg summit.9 Not surprisingly,
given the initial focus of the EES, almost all changes reported involve active labor market policies. In fact,
the few modications to the employment protection legislation in various European countries since 1998 have
shown no clear trend, some reforms or proposals corresponding to liberalization of EPL, others to its tightening
(Young 2003).10 It is to be noticed, however, that starting in 2001, the Council recommendations for the
7The European Council brings together the heads of state or government of the fteen member states of the European Union
and the president of the European Commission. The decisions taken at the European Council meetings are a major impetus in
dening the general political guidelines of the European Union.
8See the Presidency Conclusions to the various Council Meetings.
9 Impact Evaluation of the European Employment Strategy - Technical Analysis, supporting COM(2002) 416 nal of 17.7.2002.
10Although EPL tightened across Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, changes since the 1980s have also shown no clear trend. The
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individual countries did mention the need to adapt employment regulations to ensure a balance between
exibility and security for the labour force.
The Lisbon Strategy can be contrasted with the U.K.s approach toward labour market reform. For that,
one can look at speeches made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the U.K. Treasury. Going back to 1997
- and prior to the Luxembourg summit, a special summit of the G8 was organized in the U.K. Chancellor
Brown commented that employability is the key to a cohesive society which o¤ers opportunity to all its
citizens... This is a new economic agenda. It enables us to benet from exible labour markets ... We intend
to make this a key to both our Presidency of the G8 and the European Union.11 Following the G8 summit,
Chancellor Brown commented on the London Principles resulting from the conference, which include the need
for structural reforms in our labor markets.12 Finally, in February 2002, the UK Treasury and Department
of Trade and Industry jointly published a White paper Realizing Europes Potential, emphasizing the
challenging reforms ahead, in particular a commitment to better regulation across Europe ..., slashing red
tape ... and to more intelligent regulation stimulating enterprises amongst our business community.13
In fairness, there is harmony between the Lisbon Strategy and the London Principles on active labor
market policies. However, the London Principles also emphasize reform aimed at labour market exibility.
Our model allows us to address two related questions. First, why is the U.K., which has already reformed its
EPL, pushing for such reforms in the rest of Europe? Second, which is the better way to achieve reform for
the European countries, unilateral reform or concerted action at the pan-European level?
introduction of xed-term contracts has been the only signicant change (in some countries,) but its use has also been regulated
in some countries (Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes 1999).
11Employability to top the agenda in the U.K. G8 conference, UK Treasury press release, May 29, 1997. Another press
release prior to the Luxembourg summit, dated July 18, 1997, is entitled Chancellor takes job crusade to Europe.
12G8 employability action plans published,UK Treasury press release, May 9, 1998.
13White Paper sets out vision for European economic reform,UK Treasury press release, February 28, 2002. Another press
release, Meeting the challenge of economic reform in Europe,February 17, 2003, basically delivers the same message.
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3 Model
The following framework generalizes the environment developed by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) to an
international context.14 There are two dominant approaches to modelling international trade. First, there are
models in which trade is based on di¤erences between countries. These are commonly referred to as models
of national product di¤erentiation and include models where countries di¤er by technology, preferences, or
endowment. The second approach is built on increasing returns to scale. While both models provide plausible
explanations for trade, the evidence favors the national product di¤erentiation and leads us to adopt this
approach.15
Assume there are two countries, i = 1; 2, each producing an imperfectly substitutable good,16 denoted by
X and Y: Country 1 specializes in the production of good X and country 2 specializes in good Y. At time t,
the price of a unit of good X is pt and the price of a unit of good Y is qt.
In each country a large number of rms produce the domestic good. Each rm uses labor as its only input
and begins the period with a stock of workers from the previous period, nt 1. At the beginning of the period,
rms are subjected to an idiosyncratic productivity shock, st; and respond by adjusting their employment
levels. A rm in country 1 facing a price of pt for its output makes period prots of
ptf (st; nt)  witnt   gi (nt; nt 1) ;
where gi (nt; nt 1) is a cost the rm incurs to adjust its employment level from nt 1 to nt. This adjustment
cost may di¤er across countries due to di¤erent labor market policies. We focus on the role of ring costs and
14This basic model of rm level heterogeneity has also been used to study industry dynamics following trade liberalizations
(Albuquerque and Rebelo 2000) and export decisions (Melitz 2003).
15Head and Ries (2001) test these models using a panel of Canadian and US manufacturing industries. Harrigan (1997, 1999)
nd evidence of di¤erences in the TFP across countries in identical sectors, supporting the NPD approach. Treer (1995) nds
that international di¤erences in technology and tastes are crucial to predicting the pattern of trade.
16Alessandria and Delacroix (2004) consider a model in which both countries can produce both goods but with di¤erent
technologies. With empirically consistent international sectoral productivity di¤erences, the results of the model are robust.
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assume that rms must make a xed payment of  iwi for each job they destroy so that
gi (nt; nt 1) =
8>><>>:
 i  wi max f0; nt 1   ntg if nt 1  threshold,
0 otherwise,
where wi is the wage prevailing in the current period. This structure for ring costs reects the practice in
European economies to exempt small rms from such regulations.
The rm specic shocks are independent across rms, but the stochastic process for shocks is common
to all rms. The shock st follows a rst order Markov process and takes values in the set S = f0g [ [1;1).
The transition function Q (s; s0) denes the probability st+1 = s0 2 S given st = s. Firms that receive the
zero productivity shock will never receive a positive productivity shock again (Q (0; 0) = 1) and are viewed
as exiting the market.17 To exit the market a rm must re all of its current workers and pay any dismissal
costs. As an exiting rms has no revenue, its dismissal payment are covered by the owners of the rm.
Next, consider the decision of potential entrants. There is a large number of ex-ante identical potential
entrants in each period. Entrants must incur a one-time up-front cost of ce denominated in units of the locally
produced good.18 Entrants incur this cost at the end of period t and then can enter the market in period
t + 1: In period t + 1; each entrant draws an idiosyncratic shock from the distribution  (s) and then hires
workers and begins production. An entrant in period t becomes an incumbent with no stock of past employees
in period t + 1. The distribution of  is the same each period and does not depend on the number of new
entrants or existing rms.
17An alternate approach would be to allow shocks to be on R+ but require rms to pay a xed cost of producing each period
as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993).
18More generally, these start-up costs represent labor services the rm must engage prior to entry. These labor services produce
no nal goods so that they are not included in conventional measures of output.
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The preferences of agents in each country are characterized by the expected utility function
ui = E0
1X
t=0
t [u (cit)  v (nit)] ;
where cit and nit are consumption and hours worked in country i: Consumption is a composite of the foreign
and domestic goods with
c1t = c (x1t; y1t) ;
c2t = c (y2t; x2t) :
We follow Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) and assume that labor is indivisible and allow agents to trade
lotteries on the probability of working. Indivisibility of labor is now a common assumption in computable
models. In this context, this assumption is necessary for the number of employees at a rm to be well dened.
The economy behaves as if there was a representative agent with preferences dened by
Vi =
1X
t=0
t [u (cit) ANit] ;
where Nit is the fraction of agents in country i employed at time t: Every period, households purchase
consumption using income received from supplying labor, prots of it from owning rms, and lump sum
transfers of Rit from the government.19 These transfers are rebates to consumers of the ring costs collected
from the rms. Firms are owned exclusively by domestic consumers and there is no intertemporal asset trade.
19Firing costs are treated as transfers since they include severance payments. An alternate approach would assume that these
costs involve a deadweight loss. This would substantially increase the costs of these policies. This is considered in Alessandria
and Delacroix (2004).
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The period budget constraint of a country i consumer in period t is
ptxit + qtyit = witNit +it +Rit:
We abstract from international asset trade for two reasons. First, empirically there is substantial evidence of
home bias in asset ownership (Lewis 1999) and very little evidence of risk sharing across countries (Backus
and Smith 1993). Our second reason is more practical. With international asset trade, a country will by
denition share the welfare gains to its domestic labor market policies. With no trade in assets, the budget
constraints imply the following trade balance equation
ptx2t = qty1t:
4 Competitive Equilibrium
This section describes a stationary competitive equilibrium. With ring taxes, the rms problem is dynamic
as rms maximize the expected value of discounted prots net of ring costs. The individual state of a rm
is its stock of workers from the last period, e, and its current productivity level, s. The problem of rms in
country 1 is described by the following Bellman equation
V1 (s; e) = max
n0

pf (s; n)  w1n  g1 (n; e) + 1
1 + 
Z
V1 (s
0; n)Q (s; ds0)

:
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A similar problem exists for rms from country 2. This problem leads to a well-dened policy rule, N1 (s; e)
which can be used to determine period prots () and ring cost payments (r):
1 (s; e) = pf (s;N1 (s; e))  w1N1 (s; e)  g1 (N1 (s; e) ; e) ;
r1 (s; e) = g1 (N1 (s; e) ; e) :
For new entrants, the value of entering is equal to the discounted expected value of beginning tomorrow
with technology s and no workers, where the shock s is drawn from the distribution . The free entry condition
then implies that
pce =
1
1 + 
Z
V1 (s; 0) d (s) ;
qce =
1
1 + 
Z
V2 (s; 0) d (s) ;
in country 1 and 2 respectively.
The state of the economy is characterized by the distribution of individual rm state variables in each
country. Let i denote the measure over employment and productivity levels (e; s) of incumbent rms in
country i: In period t, this measure does not include the entrants that incurred the xed cost in period t  1,
but have yet to produce. These entrants are included as incumbents in the t + 1 distribution 0i. Let Mi
represent the mass of entrants. The transition from i to 
0
i is denoted by 
0
i = T (i;Mi). In a stationary
economy, i = T (i;Mi).
Having dened the measure of incumbents and entrants, some aggregates can be computed. LetX (1;M1)
represent the amount of good X produced in country 1. Let1 (1;M1) represent aggregate prots of country 1
rms. Let R1 (1;M1) represent aggregate adjustment costs and let N
d
1 (1;M1) denote the aggregate demand
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for labor by country 1 rms. Similar variables can be dened in country 2.
X (1;M1) =
Z
f [N1 (s; e) ; s] d1 (s; e) +M1
Z
f [N1 (s; 0) ; s] d (s) ;
1 (1;M1) =
Z
1 (s; e) d1 (s; e) +M1
Z
1 (s; 0) d (s) M1pce;
R1 (1;M1) =
Z
r1 (s; e) d1 (s; e) ;
Nd1 (1;M1) =
Z
N1 (s; e) d1 (s; e) +M1
Z
N1 (s; 0) d (s) :
In a stationary equilibrium, the consumers problem reduces to the following static optimization problem,
Ui = max
xi;yi;Ni
ui (xi; yi) ANi;
s:t: pxi + qyi = wiNi +i +Ri:
The solution to this problem is characterized by the following rst order conditions
@ui
@xi
= A
p
wi
;
@ui
@yi
= A
q
wi
:
The labor supply can be solved from the budget constraint as
Nsi =
pxi + qyi  i  Ri
wi
:
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Finally, the market clearing conditions are
x1 + x2 = X  M1ce;
y1 + y2 = Y  M2ce:
As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), for accounting purposes, we dene GDPX = x1 + x2 and GDPY =
y1 + y2: The xed start-up costs are treated similarly to intermediate inputs in the national accounts.
5 Calibration
The parameter values are chosen so that the steady state in the model matches certain features of a composite
of the German, French, and Italian economies. These countries are our baseline as their ring costs are similar
and large (Bentolila and Bertola 1990) and they are fairly well integrated economically. Following these
authors, ring restrictions are set as 90 percent of annual wages.20 To reect actual European regulations,
we assume that rms with less than 15 employees are exempt from paying ring costs. Throughout the
calibration, values for the composite European country are obtained by using weights for the three countries
that reect their employment shares.21
Parameters linked to aggregate data are straightforward to choose. A period is one year so that the
discount factor is set to 0.964, which corresponds to a 4 percent annual interest rate. The production function
is chosen to be
f (s; n) = sn;
20They calculate ring costs to be (as a fraction of annual wages) 0.73 in Germany, 0.93 in France, and 1.05 in Italy. Lazear
(1990) nds severance payments of close to a year as well. In a study of the Italian economy, Garibaldi and Violante (2005) nd
that rms incur considerably higher ring costs.
21The employment shares are from the IMFs International Financial Statistics database.
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where the parameter  is set to 0:64 to match labors share of income. The entry cost is chosen so that the
price level equals the domestic wage.22
The utility function and consumption aggregator have the following functional forms,
u (c) = ln c (x; y) ;
c (x; y) =
h
!x
 1
 + (1  !) y  1
i 
 1
:
As in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2001), the utility is logarithmic in the consumption
aggregator.
The form of consumption aggregation is common in the international trade literature (Armington 1969).
The impact of domestic labor market policies are determined in part by international trade linkages. Given
the consumption aggregator, these linkages depend entirely on the elasticity of substitution  and the home
bias parameter ! > 1=2 (countries put a higher weight on their domestically produced good.) Estimates of
 vary widely in the literature depending on whether time series or cross sectional techniques are used on
aggregate or disaggregate data. Time series23 studies estimate the Armington elasticity by regressing changes
in trade ows on changes in relative prices. While some studies nd that some individual goods24 are highly
substitutable across countries, at the aggregate level elasticities are much lower, in the range of 0:5 to 1:5.
These values are consistent with those used in the international business cycle research (Backus et al. 1992,
Heathcote and Perri 2002, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc 2003) to reconcile the movements in the terms of trade
with trade ows.
We estimate the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic goods for the U.K., Germany,
22This normalization is done since one cannot disentangle whether a high rm value is due to a high price or to a high expected
value of idiosyncratic productivity.
23See Stern, Francis, and Schumacher (1976), Shiells, Stern, and Deardor¤ (1986), and Shiells and Reinert (1993).
24Cross sectional studies estimate the Armington elasticity by regressing imports on a distance related measure of trade costs.
An example of this is Hummels (2001) which estimates an elasticity of substitution of between 2 and 5 at the one digit SIC level.
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Italy, and France using the following rst order condition,
ln
x1;t
y1;t
=  ln
!
1  !    ln
px;t
py;t
+ "t; (1)
where px;tpy;t measures country 1s terms of trade. As our focus is on the long run relationship between relative
prices and relative quantities, we estimate this equation in levels. The data are discussed in the appendix and
results are reported in Table 1. Estimates of the Armington elasticity range between 1:03 for Italy and 1:79
for Germany, consistent with the evidence from previous studies.25 Given the distribution of estimates, we
focus on the case where  = 1:25 and discuss the sensitivity of our results to this value in section 7.
To determine the amount of trade integration, we compute the trade share of GDP as
Trade Share =
EXPORTS+IMPORTS
2*GDP
;
where exports and imports measure trade in goods and services. With trade shares of about 30 percent, these
European countries are fairly open compared to the US, which trades only about 12 percent of GDP. These
trade shares have grown substantially in the past forty years for both the US and Europe (see gure 1). A
substantial share of trade growth in Europe has come as a result of increased intra-European integration.
Similarly, a substantial share of the growth in trade in the US has come from increased integration with
Canada and Mexico, so that Europe and the US have become relatively less important trading partners (see
table 2). The home bias parameter is chosen to generate a trade share of 30 percent, which matches the
current average trade share in these European countries. In section 7, we discuss how results vary with trade
25The OLS estimates are 1:79 for Germany, 1:31 for France, 1:27 for the U.K. and 1:03 for Italy (see table 1.) Given concerns
over endogeneity - specically that demand shocks from cuts in tari¤s and trade cost - might bias these estimates upwards, we
also estimated the elasticity using two-stage least square. These results, although not as signicant, actually suggest substantially
lower elasticity estimates. We retained the estimate leading to the most conservative terms of trade e¤ect. It is also very close
to the equivalent estimate in Acemoglu and Ventura (2002).
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share and country size.
The idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the transition matrix Q and the initial distribution of shocks (and
the disutility of labor) are chosen to reproduce certain features of labor market data. In particular, we focus
on matching three types of statistics: (i) employment, such as the proportion the labor force employed, (ii)
rm distributional characteristics, such as average rm size, the distribution of rm size, and the contribution
to employment by rm size,26 and nally (iii) statistics characterizing establishment dynamics, such as job
creation (destruction) rates and exit rate by class size. We focus on the manufacturing sector as these goods
are most often traded.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of employment and rm demographics that we seek to match. These
statistics are calculated from an OECD dataset (see Bartelsman, Scarpetta, and Schivardi 2003) collected to
allow for international comparisons of rm demographics. Despite the di¢ culty in making international
comparisons of this type, we are encouraged by the similarity of our three European countries. Relative to
the US, European employment is concentrated in smaller rms. A nal aspect of the data that we seek to
match is the job creation rate between consecutive periods from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Shuh (1998). For
our synthetic European economy, job creation rates are 9.5 percent at the annual level.
We allow for ten positive technology shocks. Five of these shocks are chosen to match the mean employment
level in each bin {5,30,70,200,1500} from the data and ve are chosen as the endpoints of the employment
intervals {20,50,100,500,5000}. The size of the employment grid is 500 employment levels spaced between one
and a maximum of 5,000 employees.
To determine the transition matrix, we make a few assumptions.27 First, we allow the failure rate to
decline with the size of the technology shock. We choose the failure rate to drop from 10 percent for the
26 It is important to match these two distributions, since even though very large rms are quite rare, they contribute a lot to
total employment. As we will see later, changing the level of ring taxes a¤ects the relative supply of goods in each country. We
thus needed to make sure that all class sizes were given their actual contribution to output in the quantitative work.
27An alternative is to discretize a stochastic process for the shocks as in Veracierto (2001). We found that our approach led to
a better t with the characteristics of the employment and rm distributions.
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lowest technology to 1.5 percent for the best technology. Second, we constrain the probability of remaining
in the same state to be the same for rms with technology si and i 2 [1; 9]. We allow the persistence for the
rst and last shocks to be higher but constrain these to be the same. Finally, we assume that shocks only
change a rms technology by one technology level per period, with the probability of becoming less productive
exceeding that of becoming more productive.
Table 4 reports the parameters of the model. Table 3 demonstrates that the model economy matches up
well with establishment dynamics in our European aggregate.
6 Results
In this section, we report how the steady state of the world economy changes when labor market frictions are
removed.28 Since labor market regulations are more prevalent in Europe, in our baseline both countries impose
ring costs. We consider two policies: either remove all ring costs (i.e.  = 0, hence a exible economy) or
maintain the current level of taxes (i.e.  = :9, hence a rigid economy). The analysis proceeds in two steps.
First, we examine the steady state when both countries have exible labor markets (FF). This coordinated
change in policies allows us to determine how ring taxes distort labor markets and the welfare gains to
removing these distortions. Next, we examine the world equilibrium when the domestic economy unilaterally
lowers its ring taxes to zero (we call this the exible-rigid case - hereafter FR). This unilateral move induces
a terms of trade e¤ect, which distorts the division of welfare gains across the two countries. To quantify the
benet of policy changes, we calculate the percentage decrease in steady state consumption a consumer would
be willing to give up to adopt a particular policy. The focus here is primarily on welfare29 rather than the
28We focus on steady states as Veracierto (2001) nds that transitional dynamics have a small quantitative impact on welfare
calculations.
29The focus here is on the gains to removing ring taxes when terms of trade considerations matter, and is not on the optimal
scal policy given terms of trade considerations.
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rm and employment demographics as these have been studied elsewhere.30 Table 5 summarizes the results
of these experiments.
6.1 Flexible-Flexible Case
Firing restrictions substantially reduce employment, output, consumption, and wages. If both countries
eliminate these restrictions, then steady state output will increase by 4.13 percent, consumption by 4.13
percent, employment by 4.50 percent and real wages by 4.13 percent in each country. As both countries
pursue the same policy there is no change in the terms of trade so that the models results are identical to
the closed economy case. By our welfare measure, agents in each country gain 0.88 percent of steady state
consumption.
Firing restrictions distort the ability of rms to adjust to technology shocks. They also are a tax on the
lifecycle of rms given that existing rms expect to shrink and eventually go out of business. Both of these
e¤ects imply that removing ring restrictions raises the real wage in each country. With CRRA preferences,
the income and substitution e¤ects of an increase in the real wage cancel out. However in this model, lower
taxes imply a decrease in the redistributions - prots and lump-sum taxes - to domestic consumers which is
not proportional to labor income and a resulting negative income e¤ect. Consequently removing ring taxes
cause both labor supply and consumption to increase. Because of the change in labor, the increase in welfare
is considerably smaller than the increase in consumption.
For the United States, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2001) nd ring costs have larger
costs in terms of quantities and welfare. Our ndings di¤er because we consider ring taxes that exempt small
rms. Since most rms are small, many rms do not pay ring costs. This permits small rms to adjust fully
to some technology shocks. It also leads some small rms to delay expansion. With decreasing returns to
30For the impact of ring costs on rm dynamics, see Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) or Veracierto (2001).
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scale, this tends to raise the productivity of small rms relative to large rms. Consequently, exempting small
rms from ring taxes substantially reduces the productive ine¢ ciency. As this is the main channel through
which welfare is lowered in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2001), we nd smaller welfare
costs. In practice, ring restrictions exempt small rms so that the previous estimates of their welfare costs
are overstated.
In the baseline case, the welfare gains to a coordinated policy on ring taxes are 0.88 percent of lifetime
consumption. These gains are signicant compared to the gain of 0.12 percent of lifetime consumption that
Mendoza and Tesar (2005) nd from international coordination of labor and capital taxes in a two country,
neoclassical growth model. The sizable di¤erence in these ndings suggest there are benets to considering
a broader range of policy tools in models with rm level heterogeneity. We now explore how trade linkages
a¤ect the division of welfare gains, rather than their magnitude.
6.2 Flexible-Rigid Case
Eliminating ring restrictions in just one country leads to an increase in steady state output by 4.13 percent,
consumption by 3.22 percent, employment by 4.50 percent and real wages (w=p) by 4.13 in the exible
economy. The country that remains rigid experiences a 0.92 percent increase in consumption as its imports
become 3.06 percent less expensive. The rigid economy does not experience any change in employment or
output. This occurs because the change in the terms of trade changes the real wage of the rigid worker, but
the income and substitution e¤ects of this change in real wage cancel.
In total, welfare in the rigid economy increases by 0.92 percent, but the exible economy actually experi-
ences a welfare loss of -0.04 percent. This loss occurs because the large change in output worsens the terms
of trade so that the gains in consumption do not o¤set the foregone leisure. This result is similar to the
immiserizing growth result of Bhagwati (1958), where growth in output deteriorates the terms of trade so
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that real income is reduced. This is not the case here. The exible country can a¤ord more, but this extra
consumption does not compensate workers for giving up leisure.
In our baseline case, neither country has an incentive to eliminate its ring restrictions. Regardless of the
level of taxes in the other country, each country is better o¤ maintaining ring taxes on its labor market. Of
course, in equilibrium, this is suboptimal. This suggests an additional rationale for why countries have been
slow to eliminate these ring restrictions.
7 Sensitivity analysis
Here we examine the sensitivity of our ndings by varying assumptions about three features of the model.31
First, we consider the size of trade ows. We show that the gains to the reforming country are decreasing
in the share of goods exported, so that relatively closed economies have the most to gain from labor market
reform. Next, we show that the gains to the non-reforming country are increasing with the size of its imports
from the reforming country relative to its own GDP. Thus, for the same initial quantity of bilateral trade
ows, small countries have more to gain from their trading partners labor market reform than large countries.
Second, we consider how the elasticity of substitution between goods a¤ects the amount that domestic labor
market policies spill over to trading partners. As expected, we nd that when goods are more substitutable,
the reforming country captures more of the gains from reform as its terms of trade worsens by less. Finally,
we discuss how the structure of ring costs a¤ect the size of the gains from labor market reforms.
31Alessandria and Delacroix (2004) consider two additional extensions. First, they allow countries to produce both goods but
with some comparative advantage. Despite an adverse terms of trade e¤ect, countries still prefer to continue specializing after
unilateral reform for the range of productivity di¤erences reported in the literature. Second, they allow for ring taxes which are
not rebated and nd that the benets from reform are still shared with the trading partner.
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7.1 Trade Flows
Here we explore the inuence of trade ows on the welfare gains to unilateral labor market reform. First,
we show that the welfare gain is decreasing in a countrys export share. Next, show that a trading partners
welfare gain is increasing in its import share with the reforming country. Finally, we consider the case where
countries are of di¤erent sizes. This permits us to quantify the gains to the U.K. from convincing its continental
trading partners to jointly reform their labor markets.
Export and Import Shares
Figure 2a plots the share of the benets from reform that the reforming country keeps against its export
share, ranging from one percent to 50 percent, holding the policy of all its trading partners xed. It is clear
that the more a country trades, the less it benets from removing ring taxes. For trade shares above 28
percent, countries are made worse o¤ by reform. For the range of trade shares of France, Italy and Germany,
we see the gains to reform are small or negative. Thus a single countrys negative or limited gain to reform is
coming from the fact that, were this country to reform, it would su¤er from a negative terms of trade e¤ect
with all its trading partners. In other words, what is relevant to account for the reluctance to reform is the
total trade share and not country-to-country shares. Another way of saying this is that countries that trade
a lot benet the most from ring taxes. Consequently, a relatively closed economy like the U.S. has little to
gain from adopting these policies.
Figure 2b plots a non-reforming trading partners absolute welfare gain against its bilateral import share.
As expected, increasing the import share increases the size of the welfare gain. Thus, countries that are more
integrated, measured by trade shares, have the most gain from getting their trading partner to reform their
labor markets. In this respect, the U.S. has less to gain from European labor market reform than the U.K.
Asymmetric countries
To get a better measure of the gains to the U.K. of reform of continental labor markets, we modify the
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model to include two countries of di¤erent sizes. For simplicity, we assume that for each agents in country 1
there are N agents in country 2. Consumer have the following preferences over these goods,
C1 =

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 1

1 + (1  !) y
 1

1
 
 1
;
C2 =

!y
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 
 1
;
where now the home-bias parameter di¤ers across countries. Given the di¤erent country sizes the trade
balance and resource constraints are modied as follows
pNx2 = qy1;
Nx2 + x = GDPX ;
Ny2 + y1 = GDPY :
This case quanties the gains to the U.K. of coordinated reform by its continental trading partners. As
such, we calibrate the model to match the bilateral trade between the U.K. and this block of countries of
approximately 7.5 percent of GDP as reported in table 2. Next, we choose N = 3:3 to match the ratio of
GDP in the continental block to that of the U.K. and nally, we assume that initially the terms of trade is
equal to 1. The benet to the U.K. in this case is equal to 0.21 percent of steady state consumption.
7.2 Elasticity of substitution
A key parameter inuencing our results is the elasticity of substitution. Combined with the trade share, this
parameter determines how the change in output from reform inuences the terms of trade. In our model, this
is the only channel through which labor market reform a¤ects its trading partners. There is some evidence
that when a countrys output grows relatively fast, its terms of trade tends to worsen. First, at business cycle
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frequencies, for G7 countries, the terms of trade is negatively correlated with output so that when countries
are growing relative fast the price of their domestically produced goods relative to imports is declining (see
table 1.) Second, for a broad cross-section of both industrialized and developed countries over the period 1965
to 1985, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) estimate an elasticity of the terms of trade with respect to output of
-0.60, or slightly above our baseline calibration value of -0.74.
Taking a linear approximation of our model, it is possible to derive the elasticity of the terms of trade
with respect to output as
" =
q  p
X  Y =
1
1 + 2b! (   1) ;
where b! measures the share of home produced goods consumed at home. A higher value of " implies a more
adverse terms of trade e¤ect for the reforming country. One can see that as the international goods become
more substitutable, the terms of trade e¤ect is weakened. The elasticity of substitution also determines how
the terms of trade is a¤ected by trade ows: the elasticity of the terms of trade increases with trade shares if
and only if  < 1. When  = 1, the income and substitution e¤ects in the consumption aggregator cancel out
and the size of foreign demand does not matter in determining the terms of trade. When the income e¤ect
dominates ( < 1,) reform in country 1 makes country 2 relatively richer. If trade shares increase, the demand
for good X relative to good Y increases, decreasing the terms of trade. The opposite mechanism takes place
when the substitution e¤ect dominates ( > 1).
Figure 3 plots the share of the welfare gain the unilaterally reforming country keeps against the elasticity
of substitution over a range from  2 [0:75; 2:5]. At the low end, when  = 0:75 we see that the reforming
country is made much worse o¤, with welfare declining by 1.04 percent of steady state consumption. At the
high end, when  = 2:5; which is much larger elasticity than used in the international macro literature, the
terms of trade e¤ect is weaker so that the reforming country keeps about 50 percent of the benet from its
change in policy. In the immediate range around our benchmark calibration of  = 1:25, we see that slightly
24
larger elasticities imply small but positive gains to trade reform. However, over this entire range of elasticities,
we see that the share of the benet exported always exceeds the export share.
7.3 Structure of Labor market Reforms
The paper nds that the welfare benets from removing ring cost policies as calculated by Hopenhayn and
Rogerson may be mitigated by both exemptions in plant size and international trade. In this section, we now
consider how our results change when small rms are not exempted from ring taxes. Exempting small rms
substantially lessens the welfare costs to ring taxes. This policy is obviously not in place in Europe, so we
only consider it to clarify how our ndings di¤er from previous papers which consider ring taxes that a¤ect
all rms in the same way. In terms of calibration, the only change from our benchmark model is that no rm
is exempted from paying ring costs.
When all rms are subject to ring taxes, the size of the welfare gains to reform are more in line with
previous ndings by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Veracierto (2001). These results are reported
in the fourth column of table 5 which reports the changes from reform in this case, and are equal to the
di¤erence between the second column, which summarizes the exible labor market and the third column,
which summarizes the economy with no ring exemptions. Now, the gains to coordinated reform are much
larger as welfare now increases by 3.96 percent compared to 0.88 percent in the benchmark case. In addition
consumption and output increase by 8.67 percent while hours increase 6.57 percent. The gains to reform are
much larger as productivity increases by 2.1 percent compared to a decline of -0.37 percent when small rms
are exempted. The average rm size declines by 3.83 percent and the number of entrants increases by 10.39
percent. By contrast, when small rms are exempted, the average rm size increases 5.47 percent and the
number of entrants decreases by 0.97 percent.
With or without exemption, removing ring taxes allows rms to operate at the e¢ cient frontier. Thus,
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average productivity should increase and average rm size should decrease as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson
(1993). However when small rms are exempted from paying these costs, reform encourages rms to stop
delaying expansion, implying an increase in rm size and a decrease in average productivity, due to decreasing
returns to scale.
That exempting small rms, which account for a relatively small share of employment, reduces the welfare
costs of these policies by nearly 78 percent is perhaps surprising. E¤ectively, when small rms are exempted,
ring taxes encourage rms to stay small. Because most rms start small and expect to stay small for a while
and remain una¤ected by the ring taxes, ring taxes do not discourage entry. Moreover with diminishing
returns, productivity stays high. Thus, it appears that not considering exemptions for small rms exaggerates
the cost of ring taxes.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of domestic labor market reform of ring restrictions on welfare in an inter-
national context. We nd that international trade considerably weakens a countrys incentive to undertake
reform as much, if not all, of the gains are exported to its trading partners through a worsened terms of trade.
In a model calibrated to match European data, we nd that none of the gains to lifting ring taxes accrue to
the country making the reforms. In fact, eliminating these ring costs actually lowers welfare in the reformed
country. These results arise because ring taxes substantially reduce output and employment and thus have
strong terms of trade e¤ects. We have shown that unilateral reform may be more di¢ cult to implement when
a countrys total trade share is higher, as it su¤ers from an adverse terms of trade e¤ect on a higher share of
its consumption, and this is regardless of the number of its trading partners.
We nd that the current level of ring taxes in Europe can be sustained. This provides a possible rationale
for the adoption of these ring costs. At the very least, it provides a plausible explanation for their persistence.
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It also suggests there may be substantial benets to international coordination to eliminate distortions in
domestic labor markets. It is important that the European Council recognizes these benets and continues
to design the reform of continental labor markets at the multilateral level. These ndings also suggest that
the U.K. has the most to gain from reform in continental Europe, and may explain why the U.K. has been
strongly pushing for these reforms. A key question remains as to why the U.K. has chosen to have exible
labor markets while France, Germany and Italy have chosen more rigid markets. A possible answer may lie in
the di¤erence in trading partners. The U.K. has noticeably closer ties to the U.S. than its European trading
partners. Finally, the model is also consistent with the U.S. not adopting ring restrictions, due to its low
trade share (table 2).
These results are developed within a model of international trade driven by specialization. We have largely
abstracted from the inuence of ring costs on the pattern of trade or the export decision of rms. Much
recent research has found that exporting rms have very di¤erent characteristics than non-exporters32 and
that the identity of exporters changes over time. Firing restrictions are sure to inuence this entry and exit
and our model can be easily extended to explore this avenue.
The model is concerned with the inuence of trade on labor market policies when there are no trade
restrictions. Some recent work has explored the interaction between trade policy and labor market reforms.
Kambourov (2003) studies the e¤ectiveness of trade reform, when ring regulations interfere with the reallo-
cation of labor across exporting and non-exporting sectors. Bagwell and Staiger (2001) study the incentives of
WTO countries to manipulate tari¤s and labor standards to improve their terms of trade and nd negotiating
and legal institutions under which an e¢ cient outcome can be obtained. We can use our setup to investigate
a related question: to what extent was the emergence of ring restrictions in European Union countries in
the late 1960s and early 1970s a response to the consequence of increased trade integration. In other words,
32See Bernard, Eaton, Kortum, and Jensen (2003).
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do countries which lose access to trade regulations as a policy instrument revert to other policies?
Finally, our focus on the interaction of ring restrictions and the terms of trade is motivated by recent
discussions of removing these restrictions within the multilateral framework of the European Community
as detailed in section 2. The model was thus set up to address both the positions of continental European
countries and of the U.K., and quantify the gains to all parties from changing this policy. We nd that the gains
di¤er considerably from traditional closed economy analyses. Clearly, other policies could be used to create
favorable terms of trade movements, possibly without some of the ine¢ ciencies associated with restricting
optimal adjustment to productivity shocks. European countries have to a large extent limited their ability
to generate a favorable terms of trade through the imposition of trade restrictions. Tax competition within
Europe is the focus of Mendoza and Tesar (2005), so we did not consider such policies. Nonetheless, it is quite
possible that other labor market policies can engender a similar terms of trade e¤ect with fewer productive
ine¢ ciencies than ring restrictions - product market regulations may also be an instrument for countries
wishing to a¤ect terms of trade in their favor. We leave this possibility for future research.
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Data Appendix:
Estimating the elasticity of substitution. To map equation (1) to the data, it is useful to rewrite it as
ln
mi;t
gdpi;t   exi;t =  ln
1  !
!
+  ln
pgdpi;t
pmi;t
+ "it;
where for country i in period t; pgdpi;t
 
pmi;t

is the gdp (import) price deator; mi;t (exi;t) measures real imports
(exports) and gdpi;t measures real gdp. The term on the lefthand side measures the relative demand of
imports to domestic absorption. We use annual data for Germany (1975 to 2002), the United Kingdom (1975
to 2002), France (1978 to 2002) and Italy (1980 to 2002). The data is from the OECDs main economic
indicators and annual national accounts. Row 1 reports estimates using OLS for the four countries of interest.
Row 2 reports estimates of the elasticity of substitution using TSLS. In this regression, to deal with the slow
response of trade ows to relative prices, we include lagged relative absorption and instrument using lagged
values of the terms of trade.
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Estimates of γ
GER FRA UK ITA
Coeff. 1.79 1.31 1.27 1.03
T-statistic 6.53 9.89 16.90 6.45
Adj. R-sq. 0.61 0.80 0.91 0.65
Coeff. 0.26 0.22 0.07 0.18
T-statistic 2.13 1.96 0.50 1.96
Adj. R-sq. 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.97
* Using lagged relative prices as instrument and regressing on lagged relative quantity.
Correlation of Terms of Trade with Y **
Ctry GER FRA UK ITA
P/Pm -0.38 -0.35 -0.16 -0.13
(P: gdp deflator, Pm: import price deflator)
** Data is for 1981:1 to 2002:4 and is hp filtered using a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 1
OLS
TSLS *
USA Germany France UK Italy
Trade/Income 
(2002) 11.7% 33.6% 26.3% 26.7% 26.4%
USA 8.4% 8.3% 13.2% 6.8%
Germany 4.8% 15.5% 11.9% 16.1%
France 2.7% 10.0% 8.7% 11.6%
UK 4.4% 7.5% 8.7% 5.9%
Italy 1.8% 6.9% 8.9% 4.2%
Trade 
w/Europe 13.7% 24.4% 33.1% 24.8% 33.6%
This says that 4.8% of US trade is between the US and Germany. 
Bilateral 
Trade Share 
(2001)
Table 2 - Trade Shares
Model
European 
Aggregate1
Italy France* Germany US
Avg Firm Size 25.5 23.2 14.1 27.0 25.5 66.6
Job Creation 9.4% 9.5%
Employment to Population Ratio 0.66 0.66
Share Employment
<20 0.281 0.211 0.314 0.199 0.166 0.068
20 to 50 0.128 0.135 0.159 0.162 0.107 0.069
50 to 100 0.095 0.102 0.102 0.112 0.095 0.063
100 to 500 0.201 0.248 0.194 0.241 0.280 0.147
500+ 0.295 0.304 0.230 0.285 0.352 0.653
Share Firms
<20 0.838 0.831 0.887 0.779 0.835 0.729
20 to 50 0.101 0.101 0.076 0.140 0.089 0.150
50 to 100 0.037 0.034 0.021 0.043 0.035 0.061
100 to 500 0.019 0.030 0.014 0.033 0.035 0.049
500+ 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.012
Exit rate by bin
<20 0.095 0.101 0.093 0.127 0.090 0.094
20 to 50 0.035 0.042 0.041 0.077 0.021 0.048
50 to 100 0.028 0.031 0.032 0.063 0.011 0.040
100 to 500 0.020 0.023 0.031 0.045 0.005 0.035
500+ 0.017 0.017 0.029 0.033 0.000 0.010
* French data do not fully reflect the importance of small manufacturing firms as there is a floor on the 
sales revenue.
1 Countries are weighted by aggregate employment.
Table 3 - Model and Data
Preferences: Technology: Regulations:
β=1/1.04 A=2.14 γ=1.25 ω=.663 θ=.64 ce=48.4 τ=.9 cutoff: 15 employees.
Productivity Shocks:
s0=0 s1=2.4 s2=4.1 s3=5.0 s4=5.6 s5=6.6 s6=7.0 s7=8.0 s8=12.5 s9=15.0 s10=27.5
Distribution Over Initial Productivity Shocks:
v0=.314 v1=.514 v2=.140 v3=.030 v4=0 v5=0 v6=0 v7=.0042 v8=.0018 v9=0 v10=0
Transition Probability (Q):
1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.015
0 0.8 0.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.1 0.75 0.115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.06 0.75 0.125 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.085 0.75 0.125 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.095 0.75 0.125 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.095 0.75 0.13 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.095 0.75 0.13 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.75 0.13 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.75 0.185
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.8
Table 4 - Calibration
Baseline Flexible No exemption No exemption
Average firm size 100 +5.47% +9.30% -3.83%
Average productivity 100 -0.37% -2.47% +2.10%
JCR 9.4% 12.1% 8.8%
Output 100 +4.13% -4.54% +8.67%
Hours 100 +4.50% -2.07% +6.57%
Real wage 100 +4.13% -4.54% +8.67%
Redistributions 100 -11.82% +4.80% -16.62%
Entrants 100 -0.97% -11.36% +10.39%
Terms of trade, consumption and welfare:
Baseline RR FR, in F FR, in R FF
Terms of trade 0% -3.06% +3.06% 0%
Consumption 100 +3.22% +0.92% +4.13%
Welfare gains (%) 0% -0.04% +0.92% +0.88%
Without exemption: RR FR, in F FR, in R FF
Terms of trade 0% -6.42% +6.42% 0%
Consumption 100 +6.75% +1.94% +8.67%
Welfare gains (%) 0% +2.05% +1.94% +3.96%
Firm and employment distributions:
Baseline Flexible No exemption
Share Firms:
Less than 20 83.8% 75.1% 69.8%
20 to 50 10.1% 19.7% 23.2%
50 to 100 3.7% 3.3% 4.5%
100 to 500 1.9% 1.6% 1.9%
Above 500 0.5% 0.3% 0.6%
Baseline Flexible No exemption
Share Employment:
Less than 20 28.1% 19.2% 15.5%
20 to 50 12.8% 20.9% 21.8%
50 to 100 9.5% 8.4% 11.3%
100 to 500 20.1% 21.5% 20.8%
Above 500 29.5% 30.0% 30.6%
Table 5: The Effect of Reform
Changes from 
reform with
Baseline case: γ = 1.25, trade share = 30%, small firms exempted. All results are relative to the 
baseline case.
Figure 1. Trade Shares over time
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Figure 2a: Share of Welfare Gains and Export Share
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Figure 2b: Welfare Gain and Import Share
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Figure 3: Welfare Gains and Elasticty of Substitution
-120%
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 2.5
Elasticity of Substitution
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
 
G
a
i
n
 
K
e
p
t
